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A  substantial  amount  of  theoretical  work  predicts  that  quality  plays  an  important  role  as  a
determinant of the global patterns of bilateral trade. This paper develops an empirical framework to
estimate the empirical relevance of this prediction. In particular, it identifies the effect of quality
operating on the demand side through the relationship between per capita income and aggregate
demand for quality. The model yields predictions for bilateral flows at the sectoral level, and is
estimated using cross-sectional data for bilateral trade among 60 countries in 1995. The empirical
results confirm the theoretical prediction: rich countries tend to import relatively more from
countries that produce high quality goods. The paper also shows that a severe aggregation bias
explains the failure of the literature so far to find consistent empirical support for the "Linder
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Increasing evidence indicates that there are large diﬀerences across countries in the quality of the
products that they produce and export. While traditional theories of international trade neglect
the existence of product quality diﬀerences across countries, a substantial amount of theoretical
work predicts that quality systematically aﬀects the direction of international trade. In spite of the
theoretical predictions, there is yet no evidence evaluating the empirical relevance of quality as a
determinant of bilateral trade volumes. Understanding the inﬂuence of quality on the direction of
trade might be crucial for enhancing the predictive power of benchmark empirical trade models,
which will result in improved assessments of the impact of other determinants of trade, such as
commercial policies or natural barriers to international exchange.
Linder (1961) ﬁrst noted the role of quality as a determinant of the direction of trade. He
argued that richer countries spend a larger proportion of their income on high quality goods.
He also argued that closeness to demand is a source of comparative advantage, providing richer
countries with a comparative advantage in the production of high quality goods–the goods that
they demand. He then conjectured that the congruence of production and consumption patterns
leads countries with similar income per capita to trade more with one another. This is the Linder
hypothesis, the earliest theory explaining the eﬀects of quality diﬀerences on the direction of trade.
It has received considerable attention for its contrast with the standard Heckscher-Ohlin theory,
which predicts trade intensity to be higher between countries of dissimilar income per capita–as
the latter reﬂects diﬀerences in relative factor endowments.
More recent theoretical work has developed general equilibrium models to formalize the role of
quality as a determinant of trade patterns.1 These models share two key features with Linder’s
theory. First, rich countries have a comparative advantage in the production of high quality goods
(comparative advantage comes here from productivity or factor endowment diﬀerences). Second,
rich countries consume high quality goods in larger proportions than poorer countries. Even though
the models yield theoretical results in the spirit of the Linder hypothesis, they do not obtain this
conjecture as a general result.
Recent empirical work provides support for the supply-side relationship between per capita in-
come and quality production postulated by Linder and subsequent theorists. Schott (2004) shows
1See Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987), Flam and Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991), Murphy and Shleifer (1997).
2that export unit values increase systematically with exporter per capita income and relative fac-
tor endowments, while Hummels and Klenow (2002) use quantities exported and proxies for the
number of varieties to argue that quality diﬀerences are necessary to explain (at least part of) the
observed diﬀerences in unit values. In contrast to the evidence on the supply side, the demand-side
relationship between per capita income and quality consumption, and the impact of this relation-
ship on bilateral trade ﬂows, have not been the subject of similar empirical scrutiny. In particular,
there is yet no attempt at estimating the existence and magnitude of such a quality-driven demand
eﬀect on the global patterns of bilateral trade.2
A vast related literature has concentrated on estimating the Linder hypothesis. Since this is a
conjectured corollary to a theory that places quality at center stage, tests of this hypothesis could be
interpreted as evidence on the role of quality. This literature typically uses the gravity equation as
benchmark3, and adds a “Linder term”, a measure of income dissimilarity between pairs of countries.
The Linder hypothesis predicts a negative sign for the estimated coeﬃcient on the Linder term.
But the empirical results on the sign of this coeﬃcient are mixed.4 There is nevertheless an even
more fundamental problem than failure to conﬁrm the Linder hypothesis: the empirical framework
used by this literature cannot properly identify the role of quality as a determinant of the direction
of trade. First, the prediction that the intensity of trade is higher between countries with similar
income per capita can also result from inter-sectoral non-homotheticities in demand, not related
to quality. This is the case if income elasticities diﬀer across sectors, and richer countries have a
comparative advantage in sectors with high income elasticities.5 Second, quality eﬀects coexist with
other traditional (inter-sectoral) determinants of trade, such as diﬀerences in factor proportions.
But the gravity-equation framework does not nest these diﬀerent forces. It is thus unable to isolate
the role of quality from other inter-sectoral determinants of trade.
This paper provides a testable framework to estimate the impact of quality on the direction
2Brooks (2003) provides evidence of this eﬀect in a speciﬁcc o n t e x t .S h es h o w st h a td i ﬀerences in export shares
among Colombian ﬁrms (in industries with exports largely oriented to the US) depend negatively on the industry-level
quality gap relative to G7 countries, as measured by diﬀerences in unit value of exports to the US.
3The gravity equation, in its traditional form, postulates a log-linear relationship between the volume of bilateral
trade, the GDP of each country, and the distance between them.
4See surveys in Deardorﬀ (1984), Leamer and Levinsohn (1995), and McPherson, Redfearn, and Tieslau (2001).
5T h er o l eo ft h i st y p eo fn o n - h o m o t h e t i c i t i e sh a sb e e n addressed by Markusen (1986), Hunter and Markusen
(1988), Bergstrand (1989), Hunter (1991), Deardorﬀ (1998), and Matsuyama (2000).
3of trade. In particular, it identiﬁes the eﬀect of quality operating on the demand side through
the relationship between income and aggregate demand for quality. The theoretical framework,
described in section 2, yields an empirical speciﬁcation for estimating bilateral trade that has a
strong resemblance to the gravity equation. However, it yields predictions for bilateral trade ﬂows
at the sectoral instead of at the aggregate level. By focusing on sectoral trade, the empirical
speciﬁcation embeds and controls for inter-sectoral determinants of comparative advantage. A
parameter in the demand system captures the extent to which income per capita aﬀects quality
choice. In the empirical speciﬁcation, this parameter translates into the coeﬃcient on an interaction
term between the exporter quality and the importer per capita income. If income aﬀects quality
demand–and therefore trade patterns–this coeﬃcient is predicted to be positive.
Quality is unobservable. I follow two complementary approaches to deal with unobserved qual-
ity. First, based on recent empirical ﬁndings, in section 3 I use exporter income per capita as a
proxy for quality. The relevant term in the empirical speciﬁcation then becomes the interaction
between exporter and importer per capita incomes, capturing respectively supply of and demand
for quality. I estimate the empirical model using a cross-section of sectoral bilateral trade ﬂows (at
the 3-digit level) among 60 countries in 1995. Sectors are divided into three categories according
to Rauch (1999): Diﬀerentiated, Reference-priced, and Homogeneous. The theory is primarily ap-
plicable to Diﬀerentiated sectors. In those sectors, the results support the theoretical prediction:
rich countries tend to import relatively more from other rich countries–those that produce higher
quality goods. I also estimate the empirical model for sectors in the other two categories to check
that it is indeed quality that drives the results. In Reference-priced sectors, where the theory may
still reasonably apply, the results are similar to those obtained for Diﬀerentiated sectors. In Homo-
geneous sectors, however, the theory is not expected to apply, as the income interaction term no
longer captures supply of and demand for quality. Consistent with this prediction, the results are
very diﬀerent here; the interaction term shows no systematic eﬀect on trade.
Since the interaction term is very similar to a Linder term, the results can be interpreted as a
sector-level conﬁrmation of the Linder hypothesis. Furthermore, they are not sensitive to the use
of alternative Linder terms often used in the literature. But when the empirical speciﬁcation is
estimated on aggregate trade ﬂows–as is typically done–the results are reversed. I show that this
is the result of an aggregation bias, the direction of which depends on the extent of cross-country
4correlation between per capita income and sectoral pattern of specialization. The aggregation bias
explains the failure of the literature so far to ﬁnd consistent evidence in support of the Linder
hypothesis. If quality drives its main insight–as originally conjectured by Linder–this suggests
a reformulation of the hypothesis as a sector-level prediction, requiring inter-sectoral determinants
of trade to be controlled for.
Keeping constant factors such as production costs, we expect higher quality goods to command
higher prices. Export prices then convey useful information on product quality. In section 4, I
construct export price indices at the sectoral level from unit values of exports to the US (calculated
at the ﬁnest possible level of aggregation). I then use these indices as indicators of quality. The
advantage of this approach, relative to the approach in the previous section, is the use of cross-
sector variation in export price indices within countries to capture cross-sector variation in quality
levels. The disadvantage is that measurement error is pervasive in the dataset used to construct the
indices. The ﬁndings here are still consistent with the theoretical prediction: rich countries tend
to import relatively more from countries that produce higher quality goods. These results further
support the ﬁndings in the previous section on the role of quality as a determinant of trade. They
also provide complementary evidence that it is quality–as opposed to other factors correlated with
income per capita but unrelated to quality– that drives those results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 The Demand System
Demand in each country k is generated by a representative consumer with a two-tier utility function.
The upper tier utility is weakly separable into subutility indices deﬁned for each diﬀerentiated-good












The subutility index uk
g is a general function of the quantity consumed of good g. The subutility
index uk
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5where uk
z is deﬁned over all varieties h ∈ Hz in sector z.I n ( 2 ) , qh and θh are the quantity and
quality of variety h, and the parameter γk
z is the intensity of preference for quality of country k.
None of the parameters is restricted to be the same across sectors.
The subutility functions uk
z are an augmented version of the Dixit-Stiglitz structure of pref-
erences. Quality enters as a utility shifter, while there is still a horizontal dimension of product
diﬀerentiation (consumers love variety). This speciﬁcation of utility is designed to capture diﬀer-
ences across countries in quality demand, stemming from their diﬀerences in income. For a given
shape of the income distribution, we expect countries with higher average income to consume a
larger proportion of high-quality goods. In the demand system that this utility generates, the pa-
rameter γk captures–in a reduced form–the eﬀect of income on quality demand at the aggregate
level.
The representative consumer uses two-stage budgeting. In the ﬁrst stage, for a given expenditure
allocation across sectors Ek
1,...,Ek
Z,...,Ek
























where σz =1 /(1 − αz) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution, and pk
h is the price of h faced by
consumers in country k. Equation (3) shows expenditure on h as a share sk(h) of total expenditure

































¶1−σz > 0. (4)
Equation (4) highlights the main characteristic of the demand system. For a variety h of above-
average quality–the term in brackets in (4) is positive–a higher γk induces a larger share spent
on h. For a variety h of below-average quality, a higher γk induces a smaller share spent on h.
Countries with higher γk thus spend a larger share of their income on high quality goods. Allowing
γk to vary across countries, this demand system has the convenient property of accommodating
in a simple form cross-country diﬀerences in the pattern of expenditures for goods of diﬀerent
6quality.6 A special case arises when γk is the same for every country. In that case, the demand
system is equivalent to the demand system generated by the Dixit-Stiglitz structure of preferences,
w h e r et h e r ea r en od i ﬀerences across countries in quality choice.7 Since Dixit-Stiglitz preferences
are standard in international trade models and empirical frameworks with product diﬀerentiation,
the proposed demand system has the additional advantage of embedding a meaningful benchmark
against which to assess the impact of quality on aggregate demand and trade.
2.2 Bilateral trade ﬂows at the sectoral level
Country i produces Niz diﬀerent varieties in sector z. These varieties are symmetric; they share the
same quality and sell at the same price.8 We can multiply equation (3) by the number of varieties






















w h e r ew eu s epk
iz = pizτk
iz, the equality between import price and the product of export price and
trade cost factor between i and k.
Countries diﬀer in the quality of the goods they produce and in their pattern of sectoral spe-
cialization. Recent empirical work [Schott (2004), Hummels and Klenow (2002)] provides evidence
characterizing supply-side determinants of quality production. This paper instead takes the distrib-
ution of quality production across countries as given and, conditional on this distribution, attempts
to identify the eﬀect of quality on the direction of trade operating on the demand side through the
relationship between income and quality choice. Income as a determinant of the demand for prod-
uct quality–and hence of the intensity of trade between country pairs–has been one the main
ingredients of most theoretical work addressing the impact of quality on the direction of trade.
6I do not address here the eﬀects of diﬀerences in higher moments of the income distribution. See Francois and
Kaplan (1996) and Dalgin, Mitra, and Trindade (2004) for an empirical treatment of inequality and trade based on
inter-sectoral non-homotheticities.
7In this case, quantity substitutes for quality at the same rate in every country. Quantities and prices can then
be renormalized to "common-quality" units to obtain the typical Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation.
8This will not be a strong restriction so long as the variation of quality levels within countries is small compared
to the variation of quality levels between countries.
7However, there is yet no empirical evidence identifying this eﬀe c ti ng l o b a lp a t t e r n so ft r a d e .
The proposed demand system allows quality choice to depend on a country-speciﬁc parameter.
In the special case with equal γk across countries, the demand system is equivalent to the standard
Dixit-Stiglitz structure of preferences, which does not allow the demand for quality to vary across
countries. I show next that Dixit-Stiglitz preferences impose a strong restriction on the relationship
between bilateral ﬂows at the sectoral level. This restriction is independent of the distribution of
quality production across countries, and thus provides a key for identifying quality eﬀects on the
direction of trade.
Using (5), consider US (country k) imports of Rubber Tires (sector z) from Germany (country
i). Consider also US imports of tires from Turkey (country j) by replacing i with j in (5). The ratio
between these two expressions indicates the ratio of US imports of tires from Germany relative to
those originating from Turkey, and is independent of the expenditure level and the price index for




















Replacing k with l in (6), consider the same ratio for a diﬀerent importer, Argentina (country











































There are three possible cases in (8). The ﬁrst one is trivial. If Germany and Turkey produce
t h es a m eq u a l i t yo ft i r e s( θi = θj), then relative imports from Germany and Turkey are the
same for both the US and Argentina (rkl
ij =1 ). A much more relevant case is the second one,
which is our benchmark case of no income eﬀects on quality choice. If the US and Argentina
have the same intensity of preference for quality (γk = γl), then relative imports from Germany
and Turkey will still be thes a m ef o rb o t hi m p o r t e r s( rkl
ij =1 ), even if qualities are diﬀerent
(θi 6= θj). As argued before, standard Dixit-Stiglitz preferences can accommodate this case after an
8appropriate normalization to “common-quality” units. Thus interpreted, these preferences impose
the restriction that any two countries’ relative imports from any other two countries are identical,
i.e. rkl
ij =1 , regardless of the quality produced by the two exporting countries.9 The restriction
does not neglect inter-sectoral determinants of trade. Suppose that Germany has a comparative
advantage in producing tires. Then, Germany will have many ﬁrms in this sector. Niz will be large,
and Germany will be a large exporter of tires.10 But exports from Germany will be large to both
the US and Argentina without aﬀecting rkl
ij. A similar exercise focusing on an importer provides the
same answer. Suppose that Argentina has a comparative advantage in producing tires. We then
expect a large number of ﬁrms there, leading to a low price index for tires since domestic goods do
not pay trade costs. Relative prices of imported varieties will then be high, discouraging Argentina’s
imports from both Germany and Turkey. But again, rkl
ij will not be aﬀected. Finally, suppose that
Ek
z is large for the US because of a combination of size and inter-sectoral non-homotheticities in
demand. This will aﬀect US imports from both countries proportionally, but it will still not aﬀect
the relative ratio rkl
ij.
It is only in the third case, where both quality and the intensity of preference for quality are
diﬀerent (θi 6= θj and γk 6= γl), that rkl
ij 6=1 . Only then will quality aﬀect the relative intensity of
sectoral trade between diﬀerent country pairs. If Germany’s quality is higher (θi >θ j)a n dU S ’ s
intensity of preference for quality is higher (γk >γ l), then the US will import relatively more from
Germany while Argentina will import relatively more from Turkey. More generally, countries with
higher γk will import relatively more from countries that produce higher quality goods.
Taking logarithms on both sides of equation (5), we obtain the following prediction for bilateral
trade:
lnimpk












z − e σz lnτk
iz + e σzγk
z lnθiz, (9)
where e σz = σz − 1. In a cross-section of bilateral trade ﬂows, the ﬁr s tt w ot e r m so nt h eR H S
are speciﬁc to exporting country i. These terms take the same value when i is the exporter,
independent of who importer k is. In the econometric speciﬁcation, they will be captured by
exporter ﬁxed eﬀects. Similarly, the next two terms are speciﬁct oi m p o r t e rk and take the same
9In the more general case, this is only true after controlling for diﬀerences in bilateral trade costs.
10Romalis (2004) derives the eﬀect of comparative advantage on the number of ﬁrms in a Heckscher-Ohlin model
that accounts for product diﬀerentiation and trade costs.
9value independent of exporter i. These terms will be captured by importer ﬁxed eﬀects. Only the
last two terms are speciﬁc to the bilateral pair. I assume that trade costs are determined by:
lnτk
iz = ηz lnDistk




i is the bilateral distance between each country pair, vk
iz is a random disturbance, and
e βz is a vector of parameters associated with dummy variables Ik
i indicating whether the country
pair shares, respectively, a common border, a common language, a preferential trade agreement, a
colonial relationship, or a common colonizer.11 I also postulate a relationship between the intensity
of demand for quality–captured by γk
z–and income12:
γk
z = γz + µz lnyk. (11)
Under the null hypothesis that income does not aﬀect aggregate demand for quality, µz =0 ,a n d
γk
z = γz. This is the benchmark Dixit-Stiglitz case. Under the alternative hypothesis that it does
aﬀect aggregate demand for quality, µz > 0,a n dγk
z increases with income.
Combining (10) and (11) with (9), we obtain:
lnimpk
iz = ϕiz + ψk
z − e σzηz lnDistk
i + βzIk
i + e σzµz lnθiz lnyk + e σzvk
iz, (12)
where ϕiz and ψk
z are ﬁxed eﬀects for exporter and importer country, respectively, and βz = −e σze βz.
I am unable to estimate (12) because I do not observe quality (θiz). The next two sections deal
with unobserved quality in two diﬀerent ways. First, exporter income is used as a proxy for quality.
Second, export price indices (constructed from export unit values) are used as indicators of quality.
3 Exporter Income as Proxy for Quality
There is increasing evidence that suggests the existence of a positive relationship between per capita
income and quality supply. Diﬀerent trade theories are consistent with this evidence. For example,
a Ricardian view of quality specialization would predict that richer countries will produce higher
11The empirical speciﬁcation would not change if trade costs depended on quality, so long as they are modeled
with a (negative) function of quality as an additive term in (10). This term would be subsumed into the exporter
ﬁxed eﬀect.
12Throughout the paper–unless explicitly noted–income will refer to income per capita.
10quality goods if they have a relatively larger productivity advantage in the production of those
goods. Alternatively, a factor proportions view of quality specialization would predict that richer
countries, which tend to be capital abundant, will have a comparative advantage in the production
of high quality goods if these goods are capital intensive.13 Based on the evidence of a positive
relationship between quality supply and income, but without taking a stand on which underlying
theory generates this relationship, I postulate the following stochastic log-linear equation:
lnθiz = δz lnyi + ηiz. (13)
The random disturbance ηiz introduces quality variation between sectors for a given country, al-
lowing the cross-country ordering of sectoral quality levels to diﬀer from the ordering of income.
Substituting (13) into (12), we obtain:
lnimpk
iz = ϕiz + ψk
z − e σzηz lnDistk
i + βzIk
i + e σzµzδz lnyi lnyk + εk
iz, (14)
where εk
iz = e σzµzηiz +e σzvk
iz.14 The component disturbances ηiz and vk
iz are assumed to be uncorre-
lated with the regressors; therefore, so is εk
iz. I will estimate (14) on a cross-section of bilateral trade
ﬂows at the sectoral level. Unfortunately, I will not be able to separately identify the magnitude of
µz. But since e σz > 0, if based on the available evidence we maintain the assumption that δz > 0,
then a test of the joint hypothesis e σzµzδz =0will imply a test of the hypothesis µz =0 .
Several sectors used in the estimation contain intermediate goods. If we interpret (1) and (2)
as a production function of a ﬁnal good based on the use of intermediate inputs, then (3) is the
demand function for these inputs. In that case, it may be reasonable to assume that γk
z is not a
function of the importer income as in (11), but of the quality of the ﬁnal good θk
z (assuming that
it is demanded in only one sector). Since the quality of the ﬁnal good is in turn a function of the
importer income by (13), we can still derive (14). The error term contains additional terms in this
case, but it is still uncorrelated with the regressors.
Equation (14) is a prediction for bilateral trade at the sectoral level. Estimating it with aggregate
data would only be appropriate if the parameters were constrained to be equal across sectors. This
restriction is not plausible in general. In particular, it will be strongly violated in the case of the
exporter and importer ﬁxed eﬀects, which must be sector-speciﬁc as they control for inter-sectoral
13Schott (2004) provides empirical evidence in support of this view.
14A constant in (13) would be absorbed in the ﬁxed eﬀect ψ
k
z,w i t h o u ta ﬀecting (14).
11determinants of comparative advantage. I thus estimate (14) sector by sector. Also, to obtain a
single estimate of the parameter of interest, I estimate (14) pooling the observations across sectors.
In this case, I allow all the parameters to take sector-speciﬁc values except for the cross-sector
restriction e σzµzδz = e σµδ.
Finally, I focus on diﬀerentiated-good sectors because the theory underlying (14) is only valid
for those sectors. But I also use other sectors to benchmark the results.
3.1 Data and sample selection
The data consist of a cross section of bilateral trade ﬂows and country-level variables for 60 countries
in 1995. Bilateral trade data, disaggregated at the sectoral level, come from Feenstra (2000). The
dataset is based on the World Trade Analyzer assembled by Statistics Canada. I deﬁne sectors at
the 3-digit SITC (Rev.2) level.
I follow Rauch’s (1999) classiﬁcation of 4-digit SITC sectors into three categories. Homogeneous
sectors include goods that are internationally traded in organized exchanges, with a well-deﬁned
price (e.g., wheat). Reference-priced sectors include goods that are not traded in organized ex-
changes, but have reference prices available in specialized publications (e.g., polyethylene). Diﬀer-
entiated sectors are those sectors that do not satisfy either of the two previous criteria. Rauch uses
t w os t a n d a r d st om a k eh i sc l a s s i ﬁcation, one “liberal” and one “conservative”. I use the liberal
standard because it is more stringent in the classiﬁcation of goods as Diﬀerentiated. When a 3-digit
sector includes 4-digit subsectors that belong to diﬀerent classiﬁcations, the 3-digit sector is broken
down accordingly, each part including only the relevant 4-digit sectors.
There is a large proportion of bilateral country pairs with zero trade. The proportion is larger
for smaller countries. Since I want to prevent zero-trade observations from dominating the sample,
I concentrate only on relatively large countries. I include countries with a population larger than 3
million, and with more than 2 billion-dollar imports of Diﬀerentiated goods. Hungary is additionally
excluded because sectoral trade data are of poor quality. Algeria, Iran, Libya, and the US are
excluded because they lack data on export unit values, used in the next section of the paper. In
the case of the US, export unit values are not available because they are obtained from a database
on US imports. The ﬁnal sample consists of 60 countries, listed in Table A1. I also drop very
small sectors, keeping only sectors with a volume of trade (within the 60 selected countries) above
122 billion dollars. The ﬁnal sample includes 114 Diﬀerentiated sectors, 51 Reference-priced sectors,
and 38 Homogeneous sectors. They are listed in Tables A2, A3, and A4, respectively.
Distance measures great circle distance between capital cities and was prepared by Howard
Shatz (1997). Dummies for border, common language, colonizer-colony relationship, and common-
colonizer relationship were constructed using the CIA Factbook. Only “oﬃcial” languages are
considered in the construction of the common language variable. An exception is made for Malaysia-
Singapore, which is recorded as having a common language. Colonial links are only considered if the
colonizer-colony relationship was still in force after 1922. The indicator variable for Preferential
Trade Agreement includes PTAs in force and with substantial coverage in 1995: Andean Pact,
ASEAN, CACM, EFTA, EEA, EU, MERCOSUR, NAFTA, Australia-New Zealand, EC-Turkey,
EFTA-Turkey, EC-Israel, EFTA-Israel. Data on PPP GDP come from the World Bank WDI.
3.2 Estimation results
I ﬁrst estimate (14) separately for each Diﬀerentiated sector using OLS. Since I cannot report de-
tailed regression results for all 114 sectors, I provide summary results for the distribution of the esti-
mated coeﬃcients according to sign and signiﬁcance levels in Table 1. In all cases, heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are used. The results for the coeﬃcient of interest (the interaction term)
are shown in the ﬁrst row. This coeﬃcient is positive in more than 2/3 of the sectors (78), and
negative in less than 1/3 (36) of the sectors. The coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant in almost
1/2 of the sectors (56), and negative and signiﬁcant in 1/5 (23).
The median coeﬃcient across sectors is 0.1218. The interpretation of this coeﬃcient is related
to the ratio of ratios in equations (7) and (8). Keeping trade costs constant, and denoting b µz the








To understand this expression, take countries at the 75th percentile (Sweden and the UK) and the
25th percentile (Dominican Republican and Lebanon) of the income distribution in our sample.
Consider Dominican Republic’s ratio of imports from the UK relative to those from Lebanon. How
much would this ratio increase if the Dominican Republic were to have the income of Sweden?
Substituting for the actual income values in (15), we obtain: rkl
ijz =e x p ( 0 .1218∗1.6115∗.1.5912) =
131.366; Dominican Republic’s imports from the UK relative to Lebanon would increase by 36.6% (in
the median sector). This is the relevant exercise for interpreting the estimated magnitude of the
quality eﬀect. Other typical measures of explanatory power such as the beta coeﬃcient are very
small because size (captured by the dummy variables) and distance dominate most of the variation
in bilateral trade ﬂows.
The last column of Table 1 shows results for the pooled regression, where the coeﬃcient on the
interaction term is constrained to be the same across sectors. Here, as in every pooled regression,
the estimates are reported with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and clustering by country
pair across sectors. The pooled coeﬃcient is substantially smaller than the median of the sectoral
coeﬃcients. But we can reject the null hypothesis that µ =0at the 1% level of signiﬁcance.
The estimated coeﬃcients for the rest of the variables have the expected signs in most sectors.
Distance hinders trade, whereas Border, Common Language, PTA, Colonial relationships, and
Common Colony relationships facilitate trade, presumably through a reduction in trade costs. A
similar set of results for these variables is available from the pooled regression. Since the coeﬃcients
are allowed to take sector-speciﬁc values, there is not a unique value to report, as is the case with
the (constrained) coeﬃcient on the interaction term. To save space, I do not report these results,
which are very similar to those from the sectoral regressions.
Both the sectoral and the pooled regression results are consistent with the theoretical prediction:
rich countries tend to import relatively more from other rich countries, which are those assumed
to produce higher quality goods. However, there are two reasons for concern. First, the estimated
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly negative in a substantial number of sectors (23 out of 114). This suggests
that factors other than product quality might aﬀect the estimates. Second, per capita income
is correlated with many other characteristics of countries besides quality supply and demand, and
these other characteristics instead of quality might be driving the results. To address these concerns,
I repeat the estimation using Reference-priced and Homogeneous sectors.
Equation (14) is derived under the assumptions that there are cross-country diﬀerences in
quality levels and that quality levels are correlated with income. Even though quality diﬀerences
still exist in Reference-priced sectors and even possibly in Homogeneous sectors, the diﬀerences
in those sectors are less likely to be large. They are also less likely to be strongly correlated
with income, since higher product quality may stem from the higher quality of natural resources–
14not obviously correlated with income–instead of the accumulation of human or physical capital.
Evidence on export prices discussed in the next section suggests that, as we move from Diﬀerentiated
to Homogeneous goods, both the dispersion of quality levels and the correlation between quality and
income decrease. Equation (14) is also derived under the assumption that there are horizontal and
vertical components of product diﬀerentiation. Absent the horizontal component, goods of similar
quality would be close substitutes, and the pattern of sectoral bilateral trade would tend to have
corner solutions. In that case, (14) would not be an accurate predictor of bilateral trade. However,
so long as quality diﬀerences are substantial and are also correlated with income, (14) might still be
able to capture the quality eﬀect on average. Rich countries will still import relatively more from
countries that produce high quality, although they will import from only a few such countries. Since
the classiﬁcation into the three categories of goods was originally designed to distinguish sectors
according to their degree of product diﬀerentiation, we can expect the extent of this problem to
increase as we move from Diﬀerentiated to Homogeneous goods. In sum, we expect the theory
to work for Diﬀerentiated sectors, and we expect it not to work for Homogeneous sectors. For
Reference-priced sectors, the theoretical prediction is ambiguous, as we ignore the extent to which
the premises of the theory apply to them.
Table 2 compares the distribution of estimates for the interaction term in each category. To
facilitate comparability, the results for Diﬀerentiated goods are repeated in this table. In the case of
Reference-priced sectors, the results are similar to those for Diﬀerentiated sectors. The coeﬃcient
is positive in 2/3 of the sectors (33) and is negative in 1/3 (18). It is positive and signiﬁcant in 1/3
of the sectors (17), and negative and signiﬁcant in 1/8 (6). The median coeﬃcient is considerably
lower than for Diﬀerentiated goods, but the coeﬃcient in the pooled regression is only slightly
smaller (and also signiﬁcant at the 1% level). For Homogeneous goods, however, the results are
very diﬀerent. The estimated coeﬃcient is more often negative than positive, and more often
negative and signiﬁcant than positive and signiﬁcant. In addition, both the median coeﬃcient
and the pooled coeﬃcient are negative. The contrast can be visually appreciated in Graph 1,
which shows the frequency distribution of the estimated coeﬃcient for each category. These results
support the idea that it is quality, and not other factors correlated with income, that drives most
of the estimated eﬀect of the income interaction term. The coeﬃcient on this term matches the
predicted sign only in those categories for which the (quality-based) theory is expected to apply.
153.3 Fixed costs of exporting
Almost half of all sectoral bilateral pairs in the sample report no trade. Since the estimating equa-
tion uses the logarithm of bilateral trade, these observations must be discarded when using OLS.
Researchers working with the gravity equation have long acknowledged that dropping observations
with zero values might induce selection bias. I address this concern here using ﬁxed costs of ex-
porting to explain the substantial fraction of zero values in bilateral trade. International trade only
occurs when the proﬁts it generates cover the ﬁxed costs.
This is a censored data problem. However, the use of a standard censoring model for estimation
is not convincing for two reasons. First, we do not know the censoring value. Second, ﬁxed
exporting costs are likely to vary across bilateral pairs. I model the (unobserved) censoring value
for country-pair ik in sector z as:
logck
iz = δ0z + δdz logDistk
i + δzIk
i + δxz logGDPi + δmz logGDPk + uk
iz, (16)
where Ik
i is the same vector of dummy variables as in (14), GDPi and GDPk are total income of i
and k, respectively, and uk
iz is a normally distributed random disturbance.
Given the demand structure in (3), mark-ups are constant, and proﬁts are a constant fraction
of the value of exports: πk
iz = 1
σzimpk
iz.15 Countries trade if the proﬁts that export sales generate








iz. Therefore, up to a constant shift, (16) is in fact the equation determining
bilateral ﬁxed costs. The empirical speciﬁcation is then a censoring model with two equations, (14)
and (16), where in the ﬁrst equation the dependent variable is now a latent variable; (16) determines
the (unobserved) censoring point ck
iz, and (14) only takes non-zero values if imp∗k
iz >c k
iz.E v e n
though the censoring point is unobservable, the parameters of both equations can be estimated
jointly by maximum likelihood. This speciﬁcation is a more general version of the standard Tobit
estimation, with unknown and random censoring value.16 A shortcoming of this approach is the
implicit assumption that the decision to export is made at the country-sector level, while ﬁxed
exporting costs are in fact borne at the ﬁrm level. Another shortcoming is the need to assume a
15With a ﬁnite number of varieties, this is only true as a limiting property.
16A similar approach was taken by Cogan (1981) to model labor supply with ﬁxed costs of entry into the labor
market.
16particular distribution for the error disturbances. However, it is an appealing robustness exercise
for assessing the potential magnitude of the selection bias.
The estimation is performed sector by sector, assuming a bivariate normal distribution for the
random disturbances. Table 3 shows the results for the coeﬃcient on the interaction term in the
case of Diﬀerentiated, Reference-priced, and Homogeneous goods.17 In this and in the next tables,
I do not report results on the other controls, as they are very similar to the results in Table 1.
Despite some diﬀerences, the censoring model broadly conﬁrms the OLS results. For the Dif-
ferentiated sectors, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term is positive in almost 2/3 of the sectors
(72) and is positive and signiﬁcant in almost 1/2 of them (52). The sign of the coeﬃcient matches
the sign obtained under OLS in all but 10 sectors, in 9 of which the coeﬃcient is statistically in-
signiﬁcant in both speciﬁcations. The median magnitude of the coeﬃcient is considerably lower in
the maximum likelihood estimation, and it is now closer to the estimate obtained from the pooled
speciﬁcation. This indicates that discarding zero-valued observations does not induce important dif-
ferences in sign and signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcients but might overestimate the coeﬃcient
magnitude. For Reference-priced and Homogeneous sectors, the results lead to similar conclusions
to those obtained using OLS. For these sectors, the magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient is not
largely aﬀected.
3.4 Aggregation bias and the Linder Hypothesis
The prediction that richer countries will import relatively more from countries that produce higher
quality goods, i.e. other rich countries, strongly resembles the Linder hypothesis, which states that
countries of similar income will trade more with one another. The Linder hypothesis is typically
tested by introducing some measure of income dissimilarity between countries–the Linder term–
into a standard empirical framework for estimating bilateral trade, such as the gravity equation.
Examples of Linder terms used in the literature are:
¯ ¯yi − yk¯ ¯, ln
¯ ¯yi − yk¯ ¯,a n d
¯ ¯lnyi − lnyk¯ ¯.T h e
results of estimating (14) are in fact not sensitive to the use of any of these Linder terms instead of
the income interaction term lnyi lnyk. This is shown in Table 4, where the signs of the coeﬃcient
on the Linder terms are reversed to facilitate comparability. Both for the sector-by-sector and the
pooled estimations, the results using the Linder terms are very similar to the results using the
17Due to computational constraints, I do not perform the maximum likelihood estimation on the pooled data.
17interaction term. Thus, we can interpret the (quality-driven) predictions of this paper as Linder-
type predictions, and the results as a sectoral-level conﬁrmation of the Linder hypothesis.
As opposed to the standard Linder hypothesis, however, these predictions hold at the sectoral
instead of at the aggregate level. At the sectoral level, inter-sectoral determinants of comparative
advantage can be controlled for. Failure to control for these determinants introduces a severe
(aggregation) bias, which obscures the eﬀect of quality on demand and trade patterns. Furthermore,
this bias explains the failure of the literature, which uses aggregate data, to ﬁnd systematic support
for the Linder hypothesis. I next discuss a very simple example, artiﬁcially constructed, that conveys
the basic intuition of how aggregation might induce systematic bias. Then, I estimate (14) using
aggregate data and show that the bias is empirically relevant.
Consider the countries of our previous example: two exporters, the UK and Lebanon, and two
importers, Sweden and the Dominican Republic (DR). Table 5 shows hypothetical exports of the
UK and Lebanon to Sweden and DR in two sectors, Machinery and Apparel. This artiﬁcial example
abstracts from trade costs and diﬀerences in size. The UK and Sweden have similar income and
a comparative advantage in Machinery. Lebanon and DR have similar income and a comparative
advantage in Apparel. Therefore, the UK is a large exporter of Machinery relative to Lebanon and
Sweden is a large importer of Apparel relative to DR. UK’s quality is higher in both sectors.
The prediction for the quality eﬀect holds at the sectoral level. In Machinery, Sweden imports
relatively more from the UK, and DR imports relatively more from Lebanon. The ratio of ratios
discussed in section 2 is higher than 1 (rkl
ij =1 .5) .T h es a m ei st r u ei nA p p a r e l ,w h e r erkl
ij =1 .5.
However, when we aggregate trade in both sectors, the quality eﬀect appears to be reversed. In the
aggregate, Sweden imports relatively more from Lebanon and DR imports relatively more from the
UK (rkl
ij =0 .73) . Using the empirical framework of this paper on the aggregated data, we would
probably ﬁnd a misleading negative coeﬃcient on the interaction term. The reason is the failure to
control for inter-sectoral determinants of comparative advantage. In the aggregate, Sweden imports
relatively more from Lebanon than from the UK, not because Sweden’s demand is biased towards
low-quality goods but because Sweden is a large importer of Apparel, the sector in which Lebanon
is a large exporter. Similarly, DR imports relatively more from the UK than from Lebanon, not
because DR’s demand is biased towards high-quality goods, but because DR is a large importer of
Machinery, the sector in which the UK is a large exporter.
18The particular direction of the aggregation bias in this example (opposite to the prediction)
hinges on the assumption that countries with similar income specialize in the same sectors. This
might not always be a reasonable assumption. The ﬁrst column of table 6 shows the results
of estimating (14) using our data of actual trade ﬂows aggregated across sectors in each of the
three diﬀerent categories of goods. In contrast to the sectoral results, the estimated coeﬃcient is
now negative for the aggregate of Diﬀerentiated sectors. Even though at the sectoral level richer
countries import relatively more from other rich countries, the quality eﬀect is overshadowed in the
aggregate by a (more powerful) composition eﬀect, the aggregation bias described in the artiﬁcial
example. This example is particularly applicable to Diﬀerentiated sectors because the assumption
that the determinants of comparative advantage are correlated with income level is likely to hold
in those sectors. For example, richer countries are typically skilled-labor abundant, and thus they
tend to be relatively large exporters of skilled-labor intensive sectors, such as Machinery. When
(14) is estimated on an aggregate of only Reference-priced goods, the coeﬃcient is also reversed,
but it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. It is not surprising that the bias is weaker here,
since diﬀerences in comparative advantage among Reference-priced sectors are often caused by
diﬀerences in the relative abundance of natural resources, which are not systematically related to
income. This is more obviously true in the case of Homogeneous sectors, where the estimated
coeﬃcient is positive, but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Finally, the last two rows of table
6 show the results when all sectors in the sample are aggregated into one, and when all trade
is aggregated, including sectors both in the sample and out of the sample. In both cases, the
aggregation bias is suﬃciently strong to reverse the sign of the estimated coeﬃcient. Incidentally,
Linder himself explicitly argued that the quality eﬀect on demand operated mostly within sectors
instead of across sectors (Linder 1961, p. 95): “Qualitative product diﬀerences are not well brought
out in empirical studies of consumer behavior along the lines ﬁrst followed by Engel. The qualitative
factor is submerged by taking broad groups of goods such as “food” or “clothing”.”
The estimation of (14) using aggregate trade is similar to a standard test of the Linder hypoth-
esis. In fact, it is primarily the Linder term that distinguishes it from usual empirical speciﬁcations
used to test it.18 The last three columns of table 6 show that the existence and direction of the
bias are not sensitive to which Linder term is used in the estimation (the signs on the alternative
18Using exporter and importer GDP instead of ﬁxed eﬀects does not substantially aﬀect the results.
19Linder terms are again reversed to facilitate comparability). Regardless of the Linder term, there
is no support for the Linder hypothesis from estimations using aggregate data.
By addressing explicitly the within-sector demand eﬀect of quality, this paper provides a uni-
fying framework for understanding simultaneously the long appeal of Linder’s premises and the
failure to ﬁnd consistent empirical support for the Linder hypothesis (the hypothesized corollary).
Linder’s premises are correct: countries with similar income have similar production and consump-
tion patterns–they produce and consume goods of higher quality. But the Linder hypothesis,
that countries of similar income trade more with each other, only holds at the sectoral level, and
relative to a benchmark where sectoral diﬀerences in comparative advantage are controlled for. At
the aggregate level, it is not a valid hypothesis, since it does not follow from the premises that are
supposed to imply it. Moreover, its empirical rejection using aggregate data is uninformative about
the validity of the premises, as the estimates come from a misspeciﬁed empirical model.
3.5 A caveat on the notion of sectoral comparative advantage
In traditional models of international trade, both the supply and the demand side treat varieties
within sectors symmetrically. For example, on the supply side of the factor-proportions model,
all ﬁrms in a sector share the same production technology. On the demand side, varieties in a
sector are either perfect substitutes (homogeneous goods) or closer substitutes for one another
than for varieties in other sectors (diﬀerentiated goods). Sectoral comparative advantage is thus
well deﬁned, as it refers to all varieties in a sector. When quality is introduced, this is no longer
true. A skill-abundant country may have a comparative advantage in skill-intensive high-quality
varieties but a comparative disadvantage in unskill-intensive low-quality varieties. While a sector
might still be well deﬁned on the demand side, the production technologies for the diﬀerent varieties
m a yb ev e r yd i ﬀerent.19 Despite this problem, the reference to sectoral patterns of comparative
advantage might still meaningfully characterize average properties of sectors. For example, exports
of Apparel are systematically larger as a fraction of total exports in poor countries, and exports
of Machinery are systematically larger in rich countries. Even though rich countries might have
19Schott (2003) argues that we should consider goods of diﬀerent qualities as diﬀerent sectors. This approach,
although appealing from a supply-side perspective, still needs to deal with the demand-side links between goods of
diﬀerent qualities.
20a comparative advantage in high-quality apparel, poor countries have a comparative advantage in
a range of qualities that accounts for most of world demand in that sector. The opposite is true
for Machinery. It is only in this average sense that we should understand any reference to sectoral
comparative advantage in this context (e.g. in the artiﬁcial example of table 5). This caveat,
however, does not undermine the validity of the empirical framework used here for estimation,
since it does not rely on any particular interpretation of comparative advantage.
4 Export Price as Indicator of Quality
Other things equal, higher quality goods are expected to sell at higher prices. Hence, we can use
prices to extract information on quality levels. This section uses export price indices, constructed
from export unit values, as indicators of quality supply. The results provide complementary evidence
of the existence of a quality-driven demand eﬀect on trade patterns. They also provide further
evidence, in addition to the use of diﬀerent categories of goods, that it is product quality that
drives the results of the previous section.
4.1 Export price indices
I construct export price indices piz, for country i and 3-digit sector z, based on cross-country
diﬀerences in export unit values. Unit values measure, for a given export category, the ratio between
the value and the quantity of exports. They are the average price for the category. Composition
problems are pervasive in unit value comparisons. If a category includes diﬀerent goods, then
diﬀerences in unit values might not merely reﬂect diﬀerences in prices but also diﬀerences in the
composition of exports within the category. To minimize the incidence of composition problems,
I measure unit values at the ﬁnest possible level of aggregation for which data are available. The
NBER Trade Database compiled by Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002) classiﬁes US imports by
country of origin and type of good at the 10-digit level of the Harmonized Tariﬀ Schedule (HTS),
the level at which import duties are deﬁned. For each of these categories and source countries, the
database provides information on the customs value and quantity of US imports, and the units in
which quantities are measured.20 Examples of 10-digit categories are:
20Customs values do not include freight, and are used as the basis for duty assessment. They are intended to serve
as arm’s length transaction values for commodities.
21HTS Code Description
1006204060 Rice, short grain, husked (brown)
1902112000 Uncooked pasta, not stuﬀed or otherwise prepared, containing eggs, exclusively pasta
5208292020 Woven fabrics of cotton, containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, weighing not more
than 200g/m2, bleached, sateens
6203492010 Men’s trousers and breeches of artiﬁcial ﬁbers
8413702022 Centrifugal pumps for liquids, single-stage, single-suction, frame-mounted, with discharge
outlet under 7.6 cm. in diameter
8418210010 Refrigerators of household type, compression type, having a refrigerated volume of under
184 liters
Based on cross-country diﬀerences in unit values at the 10-digit level, I construct export price
indices piz at the 3-digit level using a slightly modiﬁed version of the Eltetö, Köves, and Szulc
(EKS) multilateral price index, which in turn is based on bilateral Fisher indices. Appendix A
describes the methodology in detail.21
Several shortcomings are associated with the construction of these indices. Countries often
report exports to the US in only a few or even none of the 10-digit categories included in a particular
3-digit sector. When countries are active in only a few 10-digit categories, the price index is very
sensitive to measurement error. When countries are not active in any 10-digit category, the price
index has a missing value. To increase the availability and reliability of the indices, I merge two
years of data, 1995 and 1996, instead of using only one year. I also calculate the indices at the
2-digit level and then use the 2-digit indices for the relevant 3-digit categories. This procedure
has two advantages. First, the indices are more reliable, as they are based on a larger number
of observations. Second, bilateral trade observations for which the exporter’s 3-digit price index
would be missing are kept in the sample if the corresponding 2-digit index can be calculated.
The indices are based on a source database with considerable measurement error.22 To deal
with this problem, I remove observations with extreme unit values (four times above or below the
category mean) and observations with very low quantity (below the lower of 50 units or a quarter
21See also Diewart (1993), Ch.5, for properties of this and similar indices.
22The General Accounting Oﬃce (1995) conducted a detailed study of 8 speciﬁc 10-digit product categories. It found
that wide dispersion among countries in unit values of US imports within the same product category is explained by
two main factors: categories not including identical products and classiﬁcation and data entry errors. Unfortunately,
the GAO cannot assess the generality of these problems because its sample is not representative.
22of the category mean quantity). Lastly, aggregation problems may still be present at the 10-digit
level, but I expect these problems to be minimized at the 10-digit level of aggregation.
Table A1 provides summary measures of the export price indices. Ordering countries by income,
and normalizing the indices so that Canada has a value of 1 in every sector, the table shows the
geometric average of the sectoral indices for each goods category. Graphs 2a to 2c provide the
same information. The correlation between export price indices and income is positive for all
Diﬀerentiated sectors, and for most of Reference-priced and Homogenous sectors. The average
correlation across sectors is 0.45 for Diﬀerentiated sectors, 0.36 for Reference-priced sectors, and 0.23
for Homogeneous sectors. This is consistent with the supply-side assumptions of most theoretical
trade models accounting for vertical diﬀerentiation, and it conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Hummels and
Klenow (2002) and Schott (2004). The average across sectors of the cross-country dispersion of
price indices is also higher for Diﬀerentiated sectors (0.43) than for Reference-priced (0.40) and
Homogeneous (0.34) sectors.23 For any given country, there is also considerable variation in export
prices across sectors. The average across countries of the cross-sector dispersion of price indices is
0.49 for Diﬀerentiated goods, 0.40 for Referenced-priced goods, and 0.35 for Homogeneous goods.24
4.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation
Quality diﬀerences are presumably one of the main sources of cross-country variation in export
prices. However, this variation might also reﬂect diﬀerences in prices for goods of the same quality,
which might stem, for example, from diﬀerences in production costs. I postulate a reduced-form
speciﬁcation for the determination of the export price that includes both quality level and exporter
income per capita. The inclusion of the latter variable attempts to capture cross-country variation
in production costs systematically related to income. Distance of country i to the US is also included
to control for selection bias in the quality composition of exports to the US. Export prices are thus
determined by:
lnpiz = ζ0z + ζ1z lnθiz + ζ2z lnyi + ζ3z lnDistUS
i + ξiz. (17)
The partial relationship between product quality and export price is given by ζ1z. Since it is
23Dispersion measures are calculated taking the logarithm of the indices. Thus, their magnitude does not depend
on which particular country is used to normalize.
24The MATLAB code used to construct the indices and the detailed tables with the export price indices sector by
sector are available online: http://www.econ.lsa.umich.edu/~hallak/papers.html
23more costly to produce goods of higher than of lower quality, we expect this relationship to be
positive. The sign of ζ2z is instead ambiguous. Once we control for product quality, diﬀerences in
comparative advantage are likely to drive any systematic relationship between income and produc-
tion costs (and hence export prices). The relationship can take either sign. Higher income countries
often have a comparative advantage in capital-intensive sectors, as they tend to be capital abun-
dant. In those sectors, higher income implies stronger comparative advantage, and a lower export
price. We thus expect ζ2z < 0. For other (labor-intensive) sectors, higher income is associated with
comparative disadvantage. We thus expect ζ2z > 0. The caveat about the inappropriateness of a
sectoral understanding of comparative advantage also applies here. But it now applies more force-
fully since it aﬀects the empirical speciﬁcation. Once we introduce quality diﬀerences, sectors might
not be either capital or labor intensive. Within a sector, high quality varieties might be capital
intensive while low quality varieties are labor intensive. More generally, we expect the relationship
between income and production costs to vary according to quality. The constant parameter ζ2z in
(17) can only capture the sectoral average of this (quality-dependent) relationship.
The distance to the US is included in (17) to capture the Alchian-Allen conjecture. In the
presence of quality diﬀerences, trade costs might not be proportional to price. In particular, if
transport costs depend on weight, these costs will be lower as a fraction of price for high quality
goods. The quality composition of exports will then depend on the magnitude of transport costs,
which in turn depends on the distance between trading partners. Hummels and Skiba (2003)
provide evidence on the empirical relevance of this conjecture. In our sample of unit values of US
imports, this might induce selection bias as only high quality varieties will be exported to the US
by distant countries. Hence, controlling for a country’s average quality of exports to all countries
(θiz), a larger distance to the US will imply a higher quality selection of exports to that market,
and thus a higher observed price index piz. We thus expect a positive sign for ζ3z.25
The main advantage of using export price indices, compared to the use of income in the previous
section, is that their cross-sector variation is able to capture variation across sectors in quality
supply. However, there is considerable measurement error in the price indices, and their reliability
as price measures is yet untested. The indices will be a very noisy indicator of quality if the variance
25The assumption of uniform quality within country-sector in fact rules out the Alchian-Allen eﬀect. I still include
distance to the US to prevent this eﬀect from causing selection bias in the estimation.
24of the error term ξiz in (17) is large. There is then a trade-oﬀ involved in the choice between the two
approaches. But we can use the results of both as complementary evidence on the role of quality.


















Substituting (18) into (12) yields the estimating equation:
lnimpk
iz = ϕiz + ψk
z − e σzηz lnDistk
i + βzIk
i + ζ0
1z lnpiz lnyk (19)
+ζ0
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ζ1z ,a n dξ0
iz = −
e σzµz
ζ1z ξiz lnyk + e σzνk
i .
There are three interaction terms in (19): the “price interaction” (lnpiz lnyk), the “income in-
teraction” (lnyi lnyk), and the “distance (to the US) interaction” (lnDistUS
i lnyk). The parameter




3z). Assuming that ζ1z > 0,w ec a ns t i l lt e s tf o rt h es i g no fµz by testing the sign of the coeﬃcient
on the price interaction (ζ0
1z). If µz > 0,t h e nζ0
1z > 0. We cannot do the same with the income
interaction, because the sign of ζ0
2z also depends on the sign of ζ2z. We expect ζ0
2z > 0 in sectors
where rich countries have a comparative advantage (ζ2z < 0)a n dζ0
2z < 0 in sectors where they
have a comparative disadvantage (ζ2z > 0). The sign of ζ0
3z is expected to be negative, but a test
on the sign of this parameter implies a joint test on the signs of µz and ζ3z.
Since ξiz is a component of piz, the disturbance ξ0
iz and the regressor lnpiz lnyk are correlated in
(19). I calculate piz,t−1 for the (merged) years 1993 and 1994, and use lnpiz,t−1 lnyk as instrument
for lnpiz lnyk. To the extent that ξiz captures classical measurement error in the price index, the
instrument will be uncorrelated with the disturbance term. Since measurement error is substantial,
I expect the use of this instrument to remove much of the correlation between regressor and error
term. However, the disturbance ξiz might also capture omitted factors aﬀecting export prices, not
included in (17). For example, country i might have a technological advantage in sector z that
allows it to produce at lower cost. In that case, ξiz will be persistent over time, and instrumenting
with the lagged variable will not remove the correlation between regressor and error term. Since I
have no alternative instrument, this is a concern to keep in mind when interpreting the results.
254.3 Estimation results
I estimate (19) using 2SLS, sector by sector and pooling across sectors. I ﬁrst focus on Diﬀerentiated
goods, and impose the restrictions that ζ2z =0and ζ3z =0 , thus keeping only the price interaction.
Under these restrictions, it is only diﬀerences in quality (plus a random disturbance) that drive
diﬀerences in export prices.26 This is primarily a benchmarking exercise to compare the performance
of the price interaction with the performance of the income interaction (as used in the previous
section). The ﬁrst row of Table 7 shows the results. Comparing them with those of Table 1, we
ﬁnd that the number of positive and negative estimated coeﬃcients is very similar. However, the
estimates using exporter price are on average less precisely estimated; while in Table 1 there are
only 35 sectors with non-signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, there are 54 of these sectors when price is used
instead of income. The last two columns of Table 7 show the results of the pooled regression, where
only the coeﬃcient on the price interaction is constrained to be the same across sectors. The ﬁrst
of these columns shows the unweighted 2SLS results. The second column shows estimation results
with observations weighted according to the precision of the price index. Denoting by Giz the
number of active 10-digit categories used in the construction of piz, I assume that the precision of
piz is positively related to Giz, and use weights w =
p
ln(Giz). In both cases, results are reported
with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and clustering by country pair. The unweighted and
weighted regressions show similar results. Both coeﬃcient estimates are positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Maintaining the assumption that ζ1 > 0, this implies that µ>0.
The lower precision of the sector-by-sector estimates of Table 7 compared to those of Table 1
suggests that, since export prices are correlated with income, the price interaction might be merely
picking up the explanatory power of the (omitted) income interaction, itself unrelated to quality.
The second speciﬁcation deals with this concern by including both the price and income interactions
(still imposing ζ3z =0 ). The results are shown below in Table 7. When both price and income
interactions are included, the price interaction retains considerable explanatory power. In the
sectoral regressions, the sign of the price interaction is still positive in the same number of sectors,
even though the number of them with signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient decreases substantially. The
change is even stronger, however, for the estimates of the income interaction. The coeﬃcient is less
often positive, and it is positive and signiﬁcant in only a few more sectors than it is negative and
26A previous version of this paper (Hallak 2003) implicitly imposed these restrictions.
26signiﬁcant. Furthermore, the coeﬃcient on the income interaction is more aﬀected by the inclusion
of the price interaction than viceversa. This is consistent with the prediction. Once export prices
are controlled for, the sign of the income interaction depends on the relationship between income
and production costs, and is no longer expected to be uniformly positive.
In the pooled regression, only the coeﬃcient on the price interaction is constrained to be the
same across sectors. The coeﬃcients on all other variables are free to take sector-speciﬁcv a l u e s .I n
particular, the coeﬃcient on the income interaction is allowed to vary across sectors to control for
the (sector-speciﬁc) average relationship between income and production costs. In the unweighted
estimation, we cannot reject the null that µ =0 .T h i s i n p a r t r e ﬂects the fact that, while the
coeﬃcient on the price interaction is positive in almost 2/3 of the sectors, it is still negative in a
substantial number of them (39). But it might also reﬂect the fact that, in sectors where the price
indices are not accurately measured, the income interaction might end up misleadingly capturing,
because of its correlation with the price interaction, the quality eﬀect that the price term is unable
to capture itself. This is partly supported by the results of the last column, where both the
magnitude and the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient increase as observations are weighted according to
the precision of the price measure.
The last set of results corresponds to the full speciﬁcation, where distance to the US is measured
by the distance from capital cities to New York. The results here are slightly more consistent with
the theoretical predictions. The coeﬃcient on the price interaction is more often positive and
signiﬁcant and less often negative and signiﬁcant, while the median across sectors increases. The
estimates for the income interaction are unaﬀected, except for a decrease in the median magnitude.
The coeﬃcient on the distance interaction is weekly consistent with the Alchian-Allen prediction;
it is more often negative than positive, and more often negative and signiﬁcant than positive and
signiﬁcant. The median coeﬃcient is also negative. In most of the sectors, however, the estimates
are statistically insigniﬁcant. Since the empirical speciﬁcation captures the Alchian-Allen eﬀect
only indirectly–as it is not designed for that purpose–it is not surprising that it fails to identify
this eﬀect with precision.
The pooled estimates resemble those of the previous speciﬁcation. The unweighted regression
yields a positive but statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient (the p-value is 0.11). But the coeﬃcient
on the price interaction is signiﬁcant at the 5% level when observations are weighted according
27to the precision of the export price index. The diﬀerence between the unweighted and weighted
results for the price interaction suggests that measurement error in the export price indices might
be an important reason explaining the paucity of signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcients in the sectoral
regressions. In addition, the substantial change in the estimates for the income interaction term
when the price interaction is included in the regression further support the idea that quality drives
the (stronger) results of section 3. It is nevertheless appropriate here to keep in mind two strong
caveats already raised. First, the estimates may be biased due to the correlation between the
disturbance term and the instrument (the lagged price interaction). Second, the coeﬃcient on
the interaction term fails to capture the quality-dependent nature of the relationship between
production costs and income.
Table 8 shows the results of estimating (19) using OLS and alternative measures of GDP and
distance to the US. The OLS estimates are in the top panel. The sector-by-sector regressions
show that the coeﬃcient on the price interaction is less often positive and less often signiﬁcant,
while the coeﬃcient on the income interaction is more often positive and more often positive and
signiﬁcant. The median coeﬃcient also decreases for the price interaction and increases for the
income interaction. In contrast to the sectoral results, the pooled regressions show an increase in
both the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcients for the price interaction term.
The middle panel shows results using per capita GDP not adjusted for purchasing power parity.
The results are not very sensitive to which measure is used. The most salient change is that the
coeﬃcient on the price interaction in the weighted pooled regression is now signiﬁcant at only the
10% level (the higher variance of this alternative GDP measure explains the smaller magnitude of
the estimates). Finally, the bottom panel shows results when distance to the closest US coast (Los
Angeles or New York) is used as an alternative measure of distance to the US. Here, the results are
almost unchanged.
Even though the baseline results in Table 7 are in general consistent with the theoretical pre-
diction, the sign of the estimated coeﬃc i e n th a st h eo p p o s i t es i g ni nm a n ys e c t o r s .I n1 4o ft h e s e
sectors, the estimates are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. To evaluate whether sectors with similar
results have common characteristics, Graph 3 groups the 114 sectors into 11 broader categories.
For each of these groups, the upper bar summarizes the results for the coeﬃcient on the price
interaction and the lower bar for the coeﬃcient on the income interaction. The part of the bar to
28the right (left) of the vertical center line counts the number of sectors with positive (negative) coef-
ﬁcients. Darker colors represent signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. The results are systematic for some of these
groups. For example, the sign of the coeﬃcient on the price interaction is positive, as predicted,
in all 17 sectors in the group “Textiles, Apparel, and Footwear”. It is positive and signiﬁcant in
14 of these sectors. In “Chemicals”, the coeﬃcient is positive in 6 out of 7 sectors, and positive
and signiﬁcant in 3. In contrast, the coeﬃcient tends to be negative in the groups “Household
Appliances and Electronics” (5 out of 6), “Electrical Machinery and Apparatus” (6 out of 7), and
“Professional and Scientiﬁc Equipment” (5 out of 7). There is no single convincing explanation for
the observed pattern of results. Since prices are measured with considerable error, if in the latter
sectors most of the cross-country variation of export prices is due to quality diﬀerences and not to
diﬀerences in production costs, then the information conveyed by cross-country variation in export
prices not already contained in the variation of income may consist of mere noise. In that case,
the income interaction might end up capturing most of the quality eﬀe c t . A l t h o u g hi np r i n c i p l e
appealing, this explanation presumes–without evidence supporting it–that export prices reﬂect
mostly quality instead of costs in these sectors. In addition, it fails to explain why the estimated
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly negative in some sectors. The coeﬃcient on the income interaction tends
to be negative, as predicted, in groups such as “Food and Beverages” and “Textiles, Apparel, and
Footwear”, where it is plausible that lower income countries have a comparative advantage. It tends
to be positive in groups such “Agricultural and Industrial Machinery” and “Electrical Machinery
and Apparatus”, where we expect higher income countries to have a comparative advantage.
Table 9 shows the results of estimating (19) for Reference-priced and Homogeneous sectors
(the top panel replicates results for Diﬀerentiated sectors shown in Table 7). For Referenced-price
sectors, the distribution of the estimated coeﬃcient on the price interaction in terms of sign and
signiﬁcance is similar to the case of Diﬀerentiated sectors. The coeﬃcient is positive in 2/3 of
the sectors (35) and positive and signiﬁcant in 1/3 (14). However, the median magnitude of the
estimated coeﬃcient almost doubles the median for Diﬀerentiated goods. This result is conﬁrmed
by the pooled regression estimates; the coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level in both
the unweighted and weighted regressions. The coeﬃcient on the income interaction term is now
more often negative than positive and the median magnitude is negative. This is consistent with the
theoretical prediction if higher income is a source of comparative disadvantage in a higher proportion
29of Reference-priced sectors than of Diﬀerentiated sectors. Finally, the distance interaction gives
stronger support to the Alchian-Allen conjecture. In sum, the results for Reference-priced sectors
are consistent with the main theoretical prediction. But the theory would also predict weaker rather
than stronger results than those for Diﬀerentiated sectors.
As in the previous section, the estimates are very diﬀerent for Homogeneous goods. Both the
coeﬃcient on the price interaction and on the income interaction are in more sectors negative than
positive. They are almost never signiﬁcant. The distance term is negative in most sectors, but it
is also not signiﬁcant. In all three cases, the median coeﬃcient is negative.
5 Conclusions and Further Comments
A substantial amount of theoretical work predicts that product quality plays an important role
as a determinant of the direction of trade. This paper provides evidence supporting the empirical
relevance of this prediction. A key aspect of the paper is its strategy for identifying unobserved
cross-country diﬀerences in product quality. Exporter income per capita is ﬁrst used as a proxy,
yielding results that are consistent with the theoretical prediction in a majority of Diﬀerentiated-
good sectors: rich countries tend to import relatively more from countries that produce high quality
goods. These results can be interpreted as a sector-level conﬁrmation of the Linder hypothesis.
Furthermore, the inability of typical speciﬁcations using aggregate data to control for inter-sectoral
determinants of comparative advantage explains the failure so far to ﬁnd empirical support for this
hypothesis.
Concerns about forces other than quality driving the results are addressed in two ways. First,
still using income as proxy for quality, the estimation is performed on Referenced-priced sectors,
where the theory can reasonably be expected to apply, and on Homogeneous sectors, where the
theory should not apply. The results are strongly consistent with the predictions. Second, export
price indices are used as indicators of quality. The results here are weaker, but they are still
consistent with the predictions. An overall assessment of the evidence presented in the paper
provides a compelling case for quality as a signiﬁcant factor explaining global patterns of bilateral
trade.
Further research will hopefully improve many aspects of the theoretical framework and empir-
30ical strategy used here. First, an advantage of the proposed demand system is its simplicity for
capturing income eﬀects on quality choice. However, it could be extended to allow for more ﬂexible
substitution patterns, in particular, closer substitutability between goods of similar quality. This
possibility is ruled out here, which might explain why, in several sectors, the results contradict
the theoretical prediction. Second, as suggested by the theoretical work on trade with vertical
diﬀerentiation, it is not merely the mean but the entire distribution of income that matters as a
determinant of international trade. Third, the accuracy and reliability of the export price indices
used in this study is yet untested. Since unit values are likely to be the best, although indirect,
available source of information on cross-country diﬀerences in quality levels covering a broad range
of goods, further research focused on these indices seems necessary and promising.
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33A Appendix: Methodology of construction of export price indices
A representative 2-digit sector z includes 10-digit categories n =1 ,...,N. Dividing the value by
the quantity of imports in each of these categories, we obtain the unit value (average export price)
pin for country i in category n. Based on 10-digit-level prices pin, I will construct multilateral price
indices piz at the 2-digit level. Country i is “active” in category n if pin is non-missing. Country i
is active in sector z if it has at least two active categories. Otherwise, piz takes a missing value.
There is considerable measurement error in the source database. I use the following procedure
to detect and remove outliers. For each category n, I calculate the geometric mean of unit values
across countries, excluding the observations with maximum and minimum values. I then remove
observations with unit values 4 times above or below the mean. Since observations with extreme
unit values show disproportionately low export quantities, I remove observations with quantity
below the minimum of 50 units or a quarter of the average quantity for the category.
I then take country j as a numeraire. For each other country i, I calculate the bilateral Fisher
price index P
j
i between i and j, using only their common active categories (P
j
i takes a missing value
if i and j do not have any common active category). As a result, I obtain a vector of bilateral price
indices Pj,w i t hc o u n t r yj as the numeraire. I repeat this procedure taking alternatively all countries
as numeraire, and obtain vectors Pj,j=1 ,...,C,w h e r eC is the number of active countries in the
sector. These vectors are separated into three groups. The ﬁrst group contains vectors j =1 ,...,C 1,
those with non-missing values. The second group contains vectors j = C1 +1 ,...,C 2,w i t ha tm o s t
5 missing values. The third group contains the remaining vectors j = C2 +1 ,...C.
I then follow a three step procedure. I take the ﬁrst group and normalize each vector to sum









where wj is the number of active categories of country j in sector z. In the second step, I take
each vector Pj in the second group and normalize it to sum up to 1 − mj,w h e r emj is the sum
of the entries in P1
z corresponding to the the missing elements in Pj. I then impute the values in
P1
z to the missing elements in Pj, thus obtaining a normalized (to 1) vector e Pj. Using normalized
vectors e Pj,j=1 ,...C 2, I recalculate (20) and obtain P2
z . In the third step, I repeat the procedure






, where each element is piz.
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Table 1: Basic Results 
OLS - Differentiated goods (114 Sectors) 
 
    
Regressions by Sector 
  
Pooled Regression 









                  
ln(yi)*ln(yk)   78  36  56  35  23  0.1218  0.0782*** 
(0.0230) 
ln(Distanceik)   0  114    0  0  114  -1.0451     
Borderik   103  11  41  73  0  0.3260     
Common Languageik   112  2   95  19  0  0.5366     
PTAik   95  19  61  51  2  0.3755     
Colonial Linkik   110  4    89  25  0  0.8288     
Common Colonyik  88  26  20  92  2  0.3351     
                  
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in all regressions. Clustering by country pair across sectors in pooled 
regression. Columns 2 and 3 provide a breakdown of the total number of sectors by sign of the estimated coefficient. 
Columns 4 to 6 provide a breakdown by sign and significance.  
 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
 
Table 2: All Sectors 
OLS - Coefficient on interaction term 
 
    
Regressions by Sector 
  
Pooled Regression 









                  
Differentiated Goods                
 ln(yi)*ln(yk)   78  36  56  35  23  0.1218    0.0782*** 
(0.0230) 
                  
Reference Priced Goods                  
 ln(yi)*ln(yk)   33  18  17  28  6  0.0776    0.0723*** 
(0.0252) 
                  
Homogenous Goods                  
 ln(yi)*ln(yk)   18  20    3  29  6  -0.0498    -0.0453 
(0.0295) 
                  
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in all regressions. Clustering by country pair across sectors in 
pooled regression. Columns 2 and 3 provide a breakdown of the total number of sectors by sign of the estimated 
coefficient. Columns 4 to 6 provide a breakdown by sign and significance. 
 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
 
Table 3: Fixed Exporting Costs 
MLE – Coefficient on interaction term 
 
   Regressions  by  Sector 





   Pos.  Neg.    Pos.  Not  Sig.  Neg.  Median 
              
Differentiated Goods              
 ln(yi)*ln(yk)    72  42    52 36 26  0.0797 
              
Reference Priced Goods              
 ln(yi)*ln(yk)   36  15    24  22  5 0.0661 
              
Homogenous Goods              
 ln(yi)*ln(yk)    12 26   3  24  11 -0.0372 
              
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in all regressions. Columns 2 and 3 provide a breakdown of the 
total number of sectors by sign of the estimated coefficient. Columns 4 to 6 provide a breakdown by sign and 
significance.  
 
Table 4: Sectoral data: Alternative Linder Terms  
OLS – Coefficient on Linder term (signs reversed) 
 
    
Regressions by Sector 
  
Pooled Regression 









                  
Differentiated Goods                
 ln(yi)*ln(yk)   78  36  56  35  23  0.1218    0.0782*** 
(0.0230) 
 -|yi-yk|   79  35  55  41  18  0.0118    0.0090*** 
(0.0025) 
 -ln(|yi-yk|)   77  37  51  44  19  0.0504    0.0343*** 
(0.0129) 
 -|ln(yi)-ln(yk)|   78  36  58  36  20  0.1530    0.1033*** 
(0.0273) 
                  
Reference Priced Goods                  
 ln(yi)*ln(yk)   33  18  17  28  6  0.0776    0.0723*** 
(0.0252) 
 -|yi-yk|   32  19  16  28  7  0.0072    0.0070** 
(0.0028) 
 -ln(|yi-yk|)   33  18  14  33  4  0.0327    0.0307** 
(0.0143) 
 -|ln(yi)-ln(yk)|   32  19  16  29  6  0.0968    0.0826*** 
(0.0302) 
                  
Homogenous Goods                  
 ln(yi)*ln(yk)   18  20    3  29  6  -0.0498    -0.0453 
(0.0295) 
 -|yi-yk|   15  23    5  26  7  -0.0079    -0.0067** 
(0.0034) 
 -ln(|yi-yk|)   18  20    5  29  4  -0.0097    -0.0152 
(0.0182) 
 -|ln(yi)-ln(yk)|   17  21    4  27 7  -0.0860    -0.0712** 
(0.0357) 
                  
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in all regressions. Clustering by country pair across sectors in 
pooled regression. Columns 2 and 3 provide a breakdown of the total number of sectors by sign of the estimated 
coefficient. Columns 4 to 6 provide a breakdown by sign and significance. 
 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 




Table 5: The Aggregation Bias 
An artificial example 
 
    
Importer 

































                       
UK    150  300  450  150  50  200  300  350  650 
Lebanon  (L)  50  150  200  300  150  450  350  300  650 
Total  Imports  200  450  650  450  200  650  650  650  1300 
                  
Ratio  UK/L  3  2     0.5 0.33     0.86 1.17   
                         






    
1.5 
    
0.73 
 
                  
 
Table 6: Aggregate data - Failure of Standard Test of the Linder Hypothesis  














      








      








      









      










      








      
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in all regressions. The coefficients and standard errors in the third 
column are multiplied by 1,000.  
 
 * Significant at the 10% level  
 ** Significant at the 5% level 
 *** Significant at the 1% level  
 
 
Table 7: Price as Indicator of Quality 
IV - Differentiated goods 
 
   Regressions  by  Sector   Pooled  Regression 












                    
Price Only                    




                    
Price and Income                    




 ln(yi)*ln(yk)   66  48  35  51  28  0.1016       
                    
Price, Income, and Distance to US                




 ln(yi)*ln(yk)   66  48  35  51  28  0.0823       
 ln(Disti
US)* ln(yk)   53  61  11  87  16  -0.0181       
                    
 
Notes: The lagged export price index (93-94) is used as instrument for the current index (95-96). Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors in all regressions. Clustering by country pair across sectors in pooled regression. Columns 2 and 
3 provide a breakdown of the total number of sectors by sign of the estimated coefficient. Columns 4 to 6 provide a 
breakdown by sign and significance. 
 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
 
Table 8: Robustness 
IV - Differentiated goods  
 
    Regressions by Sector    Pooled Regression 












                    
OLS                    
Price, Income, and Distance to US                




 ln(yi)*ln(yk)   69  45  47  39  28  0.1113 
 
    
 ln(Disti
US)* ln(yk)   57  57  14  84  16  0.0006 
 
    
                    
GDP – no PPP 
adjustment 
                  
Price, Income, and Distance to US                






 ln(yi)*ln(yk)   66  48    34  52  28  0.0228 
 
    
 ln(Disti
US)* ln(yk)   54  60    11  87  16  -0.0125 
 
    
                    
Distance to closest US coast                
Price, Income, and Distance to US                






 ln(yi)*ln(yk)   66  48    35  52  27  0.0803 
 
    
 ln(Disti
US)* ln(yk)   54  60    13  85  16  -0.0086 
 
    
                    
 
Notes: The lagged export price index (93-94) is used as instrument for the current index (95-96). Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors in all regressions. Clustering by country pair across sectors in pooled regression. Columns 2 and 
3 provide a breakdown of the total number of sectors by sign of the estimated coefficient. Columns 4 to 6 provide a 
breakdown by sign and significance. 
 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
 
Table 9: All sectors 
IV Estimation 
 
    Regressions by Sector    Pooled Regression 












                    
Differentiated Goods                    
Price, Income, and Distance to US                




 ln(yi)*ln(yk)   66  48  35  51  28  0.0823 
 
    
 ln(Disti
US)* ln(yk)   53  61  11  87  16  -0.0181 
 
    
                    
Reference Priced Goods                    
Price, Income, and Distance to US                






 ln(yi)*ln(yk)   23  28    9  32  10  -0.0291 
 
    
 ln(Disti
US)* ln(yk)   19  32    5  35  11  -0.0436 
 
    
                    
Homogeneous Goods                    
Price, Income, and Distance to US                






 ln(yi)*ln(yk)   12  26    0  36  2  -0.1369 
 
    
 ln(Disti
US)* ln(yk)   10  28    1  35  2  -0.1186 
 
    
                    
 
Notes: The lagged export price index (93-94) is used as instrument for the current index (95-96). Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors in all regressions. Clustering by country pair across sectors in pooled regression. Columns 2 and 
3 provide a breakdown of the total number of sectors by sign of the estimated coefficient. Columns 4 to 6 provide a 
breakdown by sign and significance. 
 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 








GDP per Capita 
(PPP) 
 Differentiated  Goods  Reference  Priced Goods  Homogenous Goods 
Switzerland 25,475    1.64  1.79  1.00 
Norway 24,693    1.46  1.47  1.23 
Japan 23,211    1.48  1.92  1.31 
Canada 23,085    1.00  1.00 1.00 
Denmark 22,947    1.51  1.48  1.58 
Belgium-Lux. 22,700    1.45  1.41  0.97 
Singapore 22,270    1.09  1.26  1.17 
Hong Kong  22,166    0.79  1.28  1.06 
Austria 22,089    1.43  1.71 1.16 
Germany 21,478    1.46  1.49  1.14 
Australia 21,267    1.29  1.36  1.00 
Netherlands 20,812    1.41  1.39  1.20 
Italy 20,512    1.33 1.41  1.25 
France 20,492    1.54  1.64 1.42 
Sweden 20,030    1.46  1.56  1.49 
United Kingdom  19,465    1.39  1.47  1.25 
Finland 18,764    1.60  1.39 1.24 
New Zealand  17,705    1.30  1.39  0.95 
Israel 17,394    1.33  1.57  1.27 
Ireland 17,264    1.46  1.76 1.13 
Spain 15,163    1.29  1.21  0.93 
Portugal 13,613    1.20  1.24  1.12 
South Korea  13,502    0.91  1.25  1.28 
Taiwan 13,335    0.81  1.38 1.20 
Greece 13,147    1.10  1.20 1.13 
Saudi Arabia  10,766    1.12  1.27  1.13 
Argentina 10,736    1.02  1.10  1.00 
South Africa  8,581    1.11  1.19  1.02 
Malaysia 8,145    0.94  1.14  1.04 
Uruguay 7,831    1.04  0.79  1.02 
Chile 7,544    1.00 0.98  1.19 
Mexico 7,061    0.74  0.95 1.02 
Poland 6,605    0.86  1.11  1.09 
Brazil 6,572    0.89  1.07  1.07 
Romania 6,430    0.81  0.72  1.02 
Thailand 6,217    0.79  1.15  0.96 
Colombia 6,151    0.87  1.04  1.11 
Venezuela 5,979    0.73  0.89  0.82 
Costa Rica  5,940    0.97  1.18  0.92 
Turkey 5,803    0.93  1.33  0.98 
Bulgaria 5,608    0.91  0.86  0.79 
Tunisia 4,870    1.02  1.36 1.36 
Paraguay 4,598    0.83  0.48  0.83 
Peru 4,329    1.02 1.06  0.98 
Dominican Rep.  3,997    0.87  0.93  0.89 
Lebanon 3,964    0.94  1.13  1.13 
Philippines 3,518    0.89  1.06  0.92 
Guatemala 3,444    0.87  0.98  0.90 
Syria 3,211    1.06 1.40  0.93 
Ecuador 3,162    0.89  1.02  0.89 
Morocco 3,052    0.94  1.34  2.37* 
Indonesia 2,869    0.80  1.01  0.88 
Egypt 2,869    1.05  0.88  0.68 
Sri Lanka  2,741    0.70  1.06  1.11 
China 2,560    0.63  1.02  1.06 
India 1,877    0.82 0.97  0.87 
Pakistan 1,733    0.82  0.70  0.81 
Vietnam 1,478    0.70  1.02  0.65 
Bangladesh 1,253    0.76  1.34  0.58 
Nigeria 832    0.81  0.97  0.73 
 
Average correlation b/w sectoral index and GDP Per Capita  
 





Note:  The bottom row gives the average across sectors of the correlation between PPP GDP per capita and the price index.  
    * Morocco has price indices for only two sectors.  
Table A2. List of 3-digit SITC sectors included Differentiated sample (some 4-digit sectors may be excluded) 
 
Sector Description  Sector Description 
34  Fish,fresh (live or dead),chilled or frozen  727  Food processing machines and parts 
48  Cereal prepar. & preps.  Of flour of fruits or veg.  728  Mach.& Equipment specialized for particular ind. 
56 Vegetab.,roots  &  tubers,prepared/preserved,n.e.s. 736  Mach.tools  for  working metal or met.carb., Parts 
73  Chocolate & other food preptns.  Containing cocoa  741  Heating & cooling equipment and parts 
98  Edible products and preparations n.e.s.  742  Pumps for liquids.liq.elevators and parts 
111  Non alcoholic beverages,n.e.s.  743  Pumps & compressors,fans & blowers,centrifuges 
248  Wood,simply worked,and railway sleepers of wood  744  Mechanical handling equip.and parts 
431  Animal & vegetable oils and fats,processed & waxes  745  Other non-electrical mach.tools,apparatus & parts 
533  Pigments,paints,varnishes & related materials  749  Non-electric parts and accessories of machines 
541  Medicinal and pharmaceutical products  751  Office machines 
551  Essential oils,perfume and flavour materials  752  Automatic data processing machines & units thereof 
553  Perfumery,cosmetics and toilet preparations  759  Parts of and accessories suitable for 751--or 752- 
554  Soap,cleansing and polishing preparations 761  Television  receivers 
591 Disinfectants,insecticides,fungicidesweed killers 762  Radio-broadcast  receivers 
598 Miscellaneous  chemical  products,n.e.s. 764  Telecommunications equipment and parts 
611  Leather  771  Electric power machinery and parts thereof 
612  Manufactures of leather/of composition leather nes  772  Elect.app.such as switches,relays,fuses,pwgs etc. 
621  Materials of rubber(e.g.,pastes.plates,sheets,etc) 773  Equipment for distributing electricity 
625  Rubber tyres,tyre cases,etc.for wheels  774  Electric apparatus for medical purposes,(radiolog) 
628  Articles of rubber,n.e.s.  775  Household type,elect.& Non-electrical equipment 
635 Wood  manufactures,n.e.s.  776 Thermionic,cold & photo-cathode valves,tubes,parts 
642  Paper and paperboard,cut to size or shape  778  Electrical machinery and apparatus,n.e.s. 
651  Textile yarn  781  Passenger motor cars,for transport of pass.& Good 
652 Cotton  fabrics,woven  782 Motor  vehicles for transport of goods/materials 
653  Fabrics,woven,of man-made fibres 783  Road  motor  vehicles,n.e.s. 
654 Textil.fabrics,woven,oth.than  cotton/man-made  fibr  784  Parts & accessories of 722-,781--,782-,783- 
655  Knitted or crocheted fabrics  785  Motorcycles,motor scooters,invalid carriages 
656 Tulle,lace,embroidery,ribbons,& other small wares  786  Trailers & other vehicles,not motorized 
657  Special textile fabrics and related products  791  Railway vehicles & associated equipment 
658  Made-up articles,wholly/chiefly of text.materials  792  Aircraft & associated equipment and parts 
659 Floor  coverings,etc.  793 Ships,boats and floating structures 
661  Lime,cement,and fabricated construction materials 812  Sanitary,plumbing,heating,lighting  fixtures 
662 Clay  construct.materials & refractory constr.mate  821  Furniture and parts thereof 
663 Mineral  manufactures,n.e.s 831  Travel  goods,handbags,brief-cases,purses,sheaths 
665 Glassware  842 Outer  garments,mens,of textile fabrics 
666 Pottery  843 Outer  garments,womens,of textile fabrics 
667 Pearls,precious&  semi-prec.stones,unwork./worked  844  Under garments of textile fabrics 
673  Iron and steel bars,rods,angles.shapes & sections  845  Outer garments and other articles,knitted 
678  Tubes,pipes and fittings,of iron or steel  846  Under garments,knitted or crocheted 
679  Iron & steel castings,forgings & stampings;rough  847  Clothing accessories of textile fabrics 
691  Structures& parts of struc.;iron,steel,aluminium 848  Art.of  apparel & clothing accessories,no textile 
692  Metal containers for storage and transport  851  Footwear 
694  Nails,screws,nuts,bolts etc.of iron.steel,copper 871  Optical  instruments and apparatus 
695  Tools for use in hand or in machines  872  Medical instruments and appliances 
696 Cutlery  874 Measuring,checking,analysing  instruments 
697  Household equipment of base metal,n.e.s. 881  Photographic  apparatus and equipment,n.e.s. 
699  Manufactures of base metal,n.e.s.  882  Photographic & cinematographic supplies 
711  Steam & other vapour generating boilers & parts  884  Optical goods,n.e.s. 
713  Internal combustion piston engines& parts  885  Watches and clocks 
714 Engines  &  motors,non-electric 892  Printed  matter 
716  Rotating electric plant and parts  893  Articles of materials described in division 58 
721  Agricultural machinery and parts  894  Baby carriages,toys,games and sporting goods 
722  Tractors fitted or not with power take-offs, etc.  895  Office and stationery supplies,n.e.s. 
723  Civil engineering & contractors plant and parts  896  Art,collectors pieces & antiques 
724  Textile & leather machinery and parts 897  Jewellery,goldsmiths  and  other art.  Of precious m. 
725  Paper & pulp mill mach.,mach for manuf.of paper  898  Musical instruments,parts and accessories 
726  Printing & bookbinding mach.and parts  899  Other miscellaneous manufactured articles  
 
Table A3. List of 3-digit SITC sectors included in Reference-priced sample (some 4-digit sectors may be excluded) 
 
Sector Description  Sector Description 
11  Meat, edible meat offals, fresh, chilled or frozen  524  Radio-active and associated materials 
14  Meat& edib. offals, prepjpres., fish extracts  533  Pigments, paints, varnishes & related materials 
34  Fish, fresh (live or dead),chilled or frozen  541  Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 
36  Crustaceans and molluscs, fresh, chilled, frozen etc  562  Fertilizers, manufactured 
37  Fish, crustaceans and molluscs, prepar.  or preserv.  582  Condensation, polycondensation  & polyaddition prod 
54  Vegetab.,fresh, chilled, frozen/pres.; roots, tubers  583  Polymerization and copolymerization products 
57  Fruit & nuts (not includ.  oil nuts),fresh or dried  592 Starches,  inulin  &wheat  gluten; albuminoidal subst. 
58  Fruit, preserved, and fruit preparations  634  Veneers, plywood, improved or reconstituted wood 
62  Sugar confectionery and other sugar preparations  641  Paper and paperboard 
81  Feed.stuff for animals(not incl.unmilled cereals)  642  Paper and paperboard, cut to size or shape 
112 Alcoholic  beverages 651  Textile  yarn 
122 Tobacco  manufactured  652 Cotton fabrics, woven 
233 Synth.rubb.lat.;  synth.  rubb.& reclaimed; waste scrap  653  Fabrics, woven, of man-made fibres 
266  Synthetic fibres suitable for spinning  661  Lime, cement, and fabricated construction materials 
278  Other crude minerals  662  Clay construct .materials & refractory constr. mate 
334  Petroleum products, refined  671  Pig iron, spiegeleisen, sponge iron, iron or steel 
335  Residual petroleum products, nes.& relat. materials  672  Ingots and other primary forms, of iron or steel 
341  Gas, natural and manufactured  673  Iron and steel bars, rods, angles. shapes & sections 
511  Hydrocarbons nes, & their halogen.& etc.derivatives  674  Universals, plates and sheets, of iron or steel 
512  Alcohols, phenols, phenol-alcohols,& their  derivat. 677  Iron/steel  wire/wheth/not coated, but not insulated 
513  Carboxylic acids,& their anhydrides, halides, etc.  678  Tubes, pipes and fittings, of iron or steel 
514 Nitrogen  682 Copper 
515  Organo-inorganic and heterocyclic compounds  684  Aluminum 
516  Other organic chemicals  699  Manufactures of base metal, n.e.s. 
522  Inorganic chemical elements, oxides & halogen salts  778  Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s. 




Table A4. List of 3-digit SITC sectors included in Homogeneous sample (some 4-digit sectors may be excluded) 
 
Sector Description  Sector Description 
11  Meat, edible meat offals, fresh, chilled or frozen  268  Wool and other animal hair (excluding wool tops) 
22  Milk and cream  281  Iron ore and concentrates 
23  Butter  282  Waste and scrap metal of iron or steel 
24  Cheese and curd  287  Ores and concentrates of base metals, n.e.s. 
41  Wheat (including spelt) and meslin, unmilled  288  Non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap, n.e.s. 
42  Rice  333  Petrol.oils & crude oils obt.from bitumin. minerals 
43 Barley,  unmilled  334 Petroleum products, refined 
44  Maize (corn), unmilled  423  Fixed vegetable oils, soft, crude, refined/purified 
54  Vegetab., fresh, chilled, frozen/pres.; roots, tubers  424  Other fixed vegetable oils, fluid or solid, crude 
57  Fruit & nuts (not includ.  oil nuts),fresh or dried  522  Inorganic chemical elements, oxides & halogen salts 
58  Fruit, preserved, and fruit preparations  634  Veneers, plywood, improved or reconstituted wood 
61  Sugar and honey  651  Textile yarn 
71  Coffee and coffee substitutes  667  Pearls, precious & semi-prec.stones,unwork./worked 
121  Tobacco, unmanufactured; tobacco refuse  681  Silver, platinum & oth. metals of the platinum group 
222  Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit, whole or broken  682  Copper 
232  Natural rubber latex; nat.rubber & sim.nat.gums  684  Aluminum 
247  Other wood in the rough or roughly squared  686  Zinc 
251  Pulp and waste paper  689  Miscell. non-ferrous base metals employ.in metallgy 
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Differentiated Goods Reference Priced Goods Homogenous Goods  
 
Graphs 2a-2c: 








































































































 Graph 3: 
Distribution of Coefficients by Group
Note: The upper and lower bars in each group show the distribution of the coefficients on the price and 
income interactions by size and significance levels, respectively.
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